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Abstract
This paper introduces a new negotiating agent
model for automated negotiation. We focus on
applications without time pressure with multidi-
mensional negotiation on both continuous and dis-
crete domains. The agent bidding strategy relies
on Monte Carlo Tree Search, which is a trendy
method since it has been used with success on
games with high branching factor such as Go. It
also exploits opponent modeling techniques thanks
to Gaussian process regression and Bayesian learn-
ing. Evaluation is done by confronting the exist-
ing agents that are able to negotiate in such con-
text: Random Walker, Tit-for-tat and Nice Tit-
for-Tat. None of those agents succeeds in beating
our agent. Also, the modular and adaptive nature
of our approach is a huge advantage when it comes
to optimize it in specific applicative contexts.
keywords: Automated negotiation, MCTS,
Supply Chain
1 Introduction
Negotiation is a form of interaction in which a
group of agents with conflicting interests and a
desire to cooperate try to reach a mutually ac-
ceptable agreement on an object of negotiation
[2]. The agents explore solutions according to a
predetermined protocol in order to find an accept-
able agreement. Being widely used in economic
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domains and with the rise of e-commerce applica-
tions, the question of automating negotiation has
gained a lot of interest in the field of artificial in-
telligence and multi-agent systems.
Many negotiation frameworks have been pro-
posed [13]. They may be characterized along dif-
ferent aspects, whether concerning the set of par-
ticipants (e.g. bilateral or multilateral), agent
preferences (e.g. linear or not), issues of nego-
tiated objects (e.g. discrete or continuous), or
even the characteristics of the interaction proto-
col (e.g. globally bounded in time or number of
rounds). They run negotiating agents that use
strategies to evaluate the received information and
make proposals. Several strategies have been pro-
posed. Either fixed or adaptive, most of them rely
on a known deadline (either in time or in rounds).
However in several applications, the deadline of an
agent may change over the negotiation. The ne-
gotiation horizon may vary depending on external
elements such as other opportunities. To the best
of our knowledge, these elements have not been
taken into account so far.
In this paper, we propose to handle this issue by
designing a loosely constrained adaptive strategy
for automated negotiation. This strategy consid-
ers that: 1) the agent preferences are nonlinear, 2)
the issues of negotiated objects can be both con-
tinuous and discrete and 3) the time pressure is
undefined, and therefore the deadline of the nego-
tiation. To cope with this objective, our agent is
based on General Game Playing [11] and Machine
Learning [2]. Its strategy relies on both Monte
Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), a heuristic technique
that has been used with success for many kinds
of games (see for instance [5, 23]), and opponent
modeling techniques in order to be more efficient.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes our targeted industrial application. Sec-
tion 3 provides some background on automated
negotiation and AI strategies for games. Section 4
gives the theoretical and formal setting for bar-
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gaining in order to motivate the use of AI for
games. Section 5 introduces our strategy. Sec-
tion 6 gives some details on the agent implementa-
tion and shows its performance against a Random
Walker agent, Tit-for-Tat agent and Nice Tit-for-
Tat agent. The last section gives concluding re-
marks and perspectives.
2 Target application
This work is part of an industrial project that
addresses an economic application, the factoring.
This application requires a solution that complies
with the specific scope we consider here and which
is neglected by the literature.
When a company sells goods or services to an-
other company, it produces an invoice. The sell-
ing company is called supplier and the customer
is called debtor. Each country may define a legal
payment term of generally several weeks. More-
over, the principal may not pay within this pay-
ment term. In the supply chain, the debtor is often
much larger than the supplier. It can therefore im-
pose its own conditions at the expense of the sup-
plier. The consequences are quite harmful for the
latter: during those payment delays, its working
capital is reduced and hence its capacity to pro-
duce, fulfill future orders or pay its own suppliers.
Factoring is an interesting answer to this issue.
A funding company (called a factor) accepts to
fund the invoices of the supplier, by paying them
immediately less than their nominal amount and
assuming the delay of payment of the principal.
From the factor perspective – generally a bank or
an investment fund – the principal can be seen
as a short-term investment, where the risk of de-
faulting on payment depends on the reputation
of the principal. Since we consider the case where
the principal is much larger than the supplier, this
risk is lower and the rate is more affordable for the
supplier.
As this kind of funding may be recurrent, there
is a strong interest in automating the negotiation
between the supplier and the factor. Moreover,
some recent works have shown an increase in the
number of factoring marketplaces all around the
world [8]. However, there are several specificities
to this setting. The first specificity is the negoti-
ation domain. Several elements are negotiated at
the same time: the nominal amount to be funded
and the discount rate are the primary elements
of the negotiation. Also, for identical nominal
amounts, a factor may ask the supplier to sell in-
voices of certain principals it trusts. Finally, when
several invoices are available, the expected number
of financing days may also be negotiated. There-
fore, we consider complex issues that combine at
the same time elements of various kinds: contin-
uous (the discount rate), numeric (the numerical
amount and the financing days), and categorical
(the principal).
The second specificity is related to uncertainty
and resource availability. Automated negotiation
often considers a deadline, which defines the time
allocated to the negotiation. Most of the negotia-
tion strategies rely on this time pressure to com-
pute a concession rate. In our application, time
pressure is not constant over the negotiation. For
the factor, the time pressure depends both on the
money it has to invest and on the investment op-
portunities. If the factor has a lot of money and
few opportunities, the time pressure increases: the
factor sees not invested money as a loss. On the
contrary, when resources are limited and opportu-
nities are common, the factor tries to get a bet-
ter discount rate and the time pressure decreases.
For the supplier, the situation is even more unpre-
dictable. Time pressure depends on its opportuni-
ties to get new credit lines (including bank loans)
and even on the time the principal takes to pay
it: the negotiation may be brutally interrupted at
some point if the payment of an invoice makes it
useless for the supplier.
Automated negotiation components relying ei-
ther on a deadline commonly known by the agents,
or on a deadline private to each of them is there-
fore not applicable to our target applications. In
our target application the negotiation domain con-
sists of numerical, continuous and categorical is-
sues, the agent preferences are nonlinear, and the
time pressure is dynamic.
3 Related work
Our agent is at the meeting point of automated
negotiation and Monte Carlo methods applied to
games. In this section, we introduce both do-
mains.
2
3.1 Automated Negotiation
Various authors have explored the negotiation
strategies with different perspectives. Most of
those works have identified three components that
make up the “BOA” architecture [1]: a Bidding
strategy defines the offers the agent sends to
its opponent, an Acceptance strategy defines
whether the agent accepts the offer it just received
or if it makes a counterproposal, and an Oppo-
nent modeling models some features of the op-
ponents, as its bidding strategy, its preference do-
main and its acceptance strategy. The latter aims
to improve the efficiency of the bidding strategy
and/or the acceptance strategy of the agent. The
following subsections present the related work for
each component.
3.1.1 Bidding Strategy
Bidding strategies may depend on several ele-
ments: the history, including the concessions made
by the opponent and/or a negotiation deadline,
the utility function of the agent, and the oppo-
nent model. Faratin et al. proposed the so-called
tactics that mainly rely on the criticality of the
resources, the remaining time before the deadline
is reached or the concessions made by the oppo-
nent. All of them except the last rely on a known
deadline. The latter has been extended to create
more complex strategies, as the Nice tit-For-Tat
agent [4], which uses learning techniques in order
to improve it. Genetic algorithms [15] use gener-
ated proposals as individuals. They rely on the
time pressure for the variation of their proposals
and make some that are acceptable for their op-
ponent.
This paper advances the state of the art in the
bidding strategies by introducing and evaluating a
strategy that considers the negotiation as a game
and uses the very efficient Monte Carlo Methods.
3.1.2 Acceptance Strategy
Acceptance strategies can be divided into two
main categories [3]. The first category is called
“myopic strategies” as they only consider the last
bid of the opponent. An agent may accept an offer
when (1) it is better than the new one produced
by its own bidding strategy, (2) it is better than
the last one made by the agent, (3) it is above
a predetermined threshold, or (4) it embodies any
combination of the previous ones. The second cat-
egory consists of “optimal strategies” [3] that rely
on an opponent bidding strategy in order to opti-
mize the expected utility. They are based on the
concessions made by the opponent and a predic-
tion that the expected utility of the agent should
increase while the deadline is getting closer. So,
the first category is not suitable for our context.
We therefore propose to use the second category
in our agent model.
3.1.3 Opponent modeling
[2] presents an exhaustive review of the opponent
modeling techniques related to automated negoti-
ation. They are generally used to model (1) op-
ponent bidding strategy, (2) its utility and (3) its
acceptance strategy as well as private deadline and
a reserve price, depending on which of these ele-
ments are relevant in each context.
There are two main methods to model adap-
tive bidding strategy which does not rely on the
deadline: neural networks and time series-based
techniques. Neural networks use a fixed number of
previous offers as input, and the expected value for
the next proposal as output. Time series methods
can be generalized very easily. Among them, the
Gaussian process regression is a stochastic tech-
nique which has been used with success by [24].
Due to its nature, it can generate various propos-
als at each negotiation turn. Those proposals are
proportional to a likelihood provided by the re-
gression. We select this technique to model the
opponent bidding strategy since it is particularly
adapted to the Monte Carlo Tree Search.
The opponent utility is generally considered as
the weighted average of partial utility functions
for each issue. Two families of methods are used
to model them. The first one is based on the fre-
quency of each value among the previous opponent
bids. The methods of this family make the hypoth-
esis that the most frequent values are the ones the
opponent prefers, and that the most stable issues
are the most important for it. They are relevant in
the cases where the negotiation domain only con-
sists of discrete issues; their extension to the con-
tinuous case is not suitable to complex domains,
as it requires the definition of a distance function
which depends on the negotiation domain. The
second family of methods is based on Bayesian
Learning [14]. It is well suited for the continu-
ous case and can be easily extended to categorical
3
domains. We use it as is for the numerical issues
and make an extension for the categorical ones.
The latter is presented in section 5.1.2.
Their is two ways to learn the opponent accep-
tance strategy: either by assuming that the op-
ponent has a myopic strategy or by using neural
networks [9]. The latter is quite expensive in terms
of computation time. The weights of the network
must be updated each time the opponent makes a
new proposal.
3.2 Monte Carlo Tree Search
Monte Carlo methods are regularly used as heuris-
tics for games. Re´mi Coulom [6] proposes a
method to combine the construction of a game tree
– a traditional method for games that has proved
to be very to be effective – with Monte Carlo tech-
niques. This method is called Monte Carlo Tree
Search (MCTS) and it has been improved using
various extensions [5], including pruning the less
promising branches of the tree. It has met great
success in games, particularly games with high
branching factor [23].
MCTS consists of 4 steps. A selection is dedi-
cated to the exploration of the already built part
of the tree, based on a predefined strategy. While
exploring a node, the algorithm chooses whether
to explore a lower-level branch or expand a new
branch. In the latter case, there is an expansion
of a new node; it is created just below the last ex-
plored one. Once a new node has been expanded,
a simulation of the game is performed until a fi-
nal state is reached. Finally, outcomes of the final
state are computed and a backpropagation of
them is made over all the nodes that have been
explored.
[16] presents a recent attempt to exploit MCTS
for General Game Playing, with Automated Ne-
gotiation as a potential application. The negotia-
tion domain considered is limited to a single-issue,
discrete domain with complete information (each
agent knows what is the optimal deal for its op-
ponent). Our work is specifically made for recent
evolution of Automated Negotiation, focusing thus
on multi-issues, combining continuous, numerical
and categorical domains with incomplete informa-
tion (the agent has no information on the oppo-
nent utility profile). These differences have con-
sequences on the technical aspects of these works.
The referenced works use Upper Confidence Trees,
inapplicable in our case since it imposes the num-
ber of possible moves at each step to be finite.
Also, [16] does not require opponent modeling,
since the opponent utility profile is known.
4 Negotiation as a game
Monte Carlo Tree Search has been applied with
success to extensive games. In this section, we
show how it is possible to represent negotiation
using this model. We first associate each aspect of
negotiation to a game element. We then describe
specificities of negotiation that prevent us from
using most common MCTS selection, expansion
and simulation strategies.
An extensive game [20] consists of a set of play-
ers, the set of all possible game histories, a func-
tion mapping each non-terminal history to the
player who must play then and a preference pro-
file. By using this definition, it is possible to define
a bargaining B as an extensive game:
Definition 1 (Bargaining). A bargaining can
be represented as triple B =
(
H,A, (ui)i∈J1,2K
)
where:
1. A is the set of two players: the buyer (player
1) and the seller (player 2),
2. H is the set of possible histories of the
negotiation. Each history consists of the se-
quence of messages the agents sent to each
other: proposals, acceptance and rejection
messages. Terminal histories are the histories
ending by acceptance or rejection, and infi-
nite histories. Each message is a pair (α, c)
where α is the speech act (performative) of
the message and c is the content of the mes-
sage, i.e. a list of couples (k, v) where k is
the key of an issue of the negotiation domain
and v is the corresponding value. The history
can be divided in two parts, each part corre-
sponding to the messages sent by one of the
agents: hi = (α, c)i,
3. the player function is based on the parity of
the size of the history (we suppose that the
buyer (player 1) always plays first). Therefore
∀h ∈ H, player(h) = 2 − (|h| mod 2) where
|h| is the size of h,
4. the preference profile, ui, i ∈ {1, 2}, is an
evaluation of terminal histories with regards
to each player. If the history ends with an
4
acceptance of the agent, ui returns the util-
ity associated by the agent, if not it returns
a specific value that may depend on the en-
gaged resources.
The representation of bargaining as a game has
already been investigated in [19, 22] for single is-
sue bargaining. More complex domains has been
initially dealt by making the assumption that the
agents proposals are independent of the oppo-
nent’s ones [10]. However in recent advances in
automated negotiation, the agent bidding strate-
gies are generally adaptive i.e. the proposals made
by an agent depend on its opponent’s ones.
However, negotiation is not a classical combi-
natorial game as Chess or Go. Its resolution is
a challenge to the MCTS approach for three rea-
sons. First, it is a non-zero sum game: agents try
to find a mutually beneficial agreement which is
often much better for both agents than their re-
serve utility i.e. the situation where the agents
do not find an agreement. Second, it is an in-
complete information game: the agent preference
profiles are unknown to their opponents and gen-
erally modeled by them. These two specificities
make it impossible to use the most common imple-
mentation of MCTS, the Upper Confidence Tree
[17]. Last, we consider a large and complex do-
main that encompasses numeric, continuous and
categorical issues, with nonlinear utility functions
and possibly infinite game trees. This has several
consequences on the way the tree is explored, in
particular on the criterion followed to expand a
new node.
5 MCTS-based agent
As we explained in the previous section, nego-
tiation is a particular game. It is therefore re-
quired to adapt the heuristics traditionally used
for games to its specificities. In this section, we
present our automated negotiation agent relying
on MCTS. The agent architecture is composed of
three modules presented in Figure 1. The bidding
strategy module implements MCTS and uses the
opponent modeling module. The latter consists of
two submodules: one models the opponent utility,
the other models its bidding strategy. The last
module is the acceptance strategy, which makes
a comparison between the last proposal from the
opponent and the bid generated by the bidding
strategy. Each of the agent submodules and their
interactions are described in this section.
Selection Expansion Simulation Backpropagation
Bidding strategy
Strategy (Gaussian
Process Regression)
Utility (Bayesian
Learning)
Opponent modeling
A
ccep
ta
n
ce
stra
teg
y
Figure 1: Interaction between the modules of our
agent
5.1 Opponent modeling
In order to improve the efficiency of MCTS, we
model both the bidding strategy and the utility of
the opponent.
5.1.1 Bidding Strategy Modeling
The goal of this model is to predict what pro-
posal the opponent will make at turn x∗. To do
so, we use Gaussian Process Regression [21]. This
method produces a Gaussian with the mean corre-
sponding to the value predicted by the algorithm
and a standard deviation corresponding to the un-
certainty induced by the model.
The first step is to compute the covariance ma-
trix K which represents the proximity between the
turns (xi)i∈J1,nK of the sequence, based on a covari-
ance function, also called kernel k. Let
K =
 k(x1, x1) . . . k(x1, xn)... ...
k(xn, x1) . . . k(xn, xn)
 (1)
we then compute the distance between the turn
of the predicted proposal x∗ and the previous
turns in the vector K∗:
K∗ = (k(x∗, x1), . . . , k(x∗, xn)) (2)
The Gaussian process regression relies on the
supposition that all these values are the dimen-
sions of a multivariate Gaussian. Using results on
multivariate Gaussian, we can compute
y∗ = K∗K−1y (3)
σ2∗ = Var(y∗) = K∗∗ −K∗K−1K>∗ (4)
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where K∗∗ = k(x∗, x∗). The result corresponds
to a Gaussian random variable with mean y∗ and
standard deviation σ∗.
One of the capital aspects of Gaussian process
regression is the choice of the kernel. The most
common ones are radial basis functions (RBF), ra-
tional quadratic functions (RQF), Mate´rn kernel
and exponential sine squared (ESS). These ker-
nels are used to define distance between the turns
of the bargaining. We tested these four kernels
on various negotiations among finalists of ANAC
2014 (bilateral general-purpose negotiation with
nonlinear utilities). The table 1 shows the re-
sults of GPR for each of the aforementioned ker-
nels. We generated randomly 25 negotiation ses-
sions and modeled two agents using each kernel.
We got a total of 50 models by kernel. Each bid
of each sequence is predicted using previous pro-
posals and is used to predict following ones. The
table shows average Euclidean distance between
the actual proposals and the predicted sequences.
The lower the value, the closer is the prediction to
the actual proposal. The kernel that got the best
result is the Rational Quadratic Function. Our
agent therefore uses this one.
Kernel RBF RQF Mate´rn ESS
avg. distance 43.288 17.766 43.228 22.292
Table 1: Average Euclidean distance between ac-
tual proposals of a bargaining and values predicted
by GPR, depending on the used kernel.
This method also allows to make predictions
on the categorical issues. The method presented
in chapter 3 of [21] is also possible and relies on
Monte Carlo method for some integration estima-
tion.
5.1.2 Preference Profile Modeling
Bayesian learning described in [14] makes the only
supposition that an agent makes concessions at
roughly constant rate. Though this constraint
may seem tough, it is relatively low in compari-
son with other methods.
The opponent utility is approximated by a
weighted sum of triangular functions. A function
t of [a, b] ⊂ R in [0, 1] is called triangular if and
only if:
• t is linear and either t(a) = 0 and t(b) = 1 or
t(a) = 1 et t(b) = 0, or:
• there is some c in [a, b] such that t is linear on
[a, c] and [c, b], t(a) = 0, t(b) = 0 and t(c) = 1.
The method can be divided into two steps. First,
the agent generates a predetermined number of hy-
potheses on the utility function. These hypothe-
ses are composed of weighted sums of triangular
functions (one per issue). Each issue is therefore
associated with a weight and a triangular function.
The estimated utility of the opponent is the
weighted sum of these hypotheses where each
weight is the probability computed using Bayesian
learning. This method does not make any suppo-
sition on the opponent strategy, which makes it
more general than the frequency based techniques.
This method can be naturally extended to the
categorical issues. Given a categorical issue C =
{C1, . . . , Cn}, the partial utility function is chosen
among the set of functions of [0, 1]C .
5.1.3 Acceptance Strategy Model
Acceptance strategy is modeled in a very simple
way: a simulated agent accepts the proposal from
its opponent if and only if its utility is better
than the utility generated by the bidding strat-
egy model. This method presented by Baarslag et
al. in [2] is not computationally expensive.
5.2 MCTS-Based Bidding Strategy
Monte Carlo methods are very adaptive, and
achieve promising results in various games, includ-
ing games with high branching factor. In this sec-
tion, we describe the way we have adapted these
methods to the negotiation context.
5.2.1 Raw MCTS
As we explained before, MCTS is a general algo-
rithm and relies on several strategies. Each time
an agent needs to take a decision, it generates a
new tree and explores it using MCTS. The most
common implementation of MCTS is Upper Con-
fidence Tree (UCT). This method has proved to
be very efficient, particularly for Go. Neverthe-
less, it expands a new node whenever it explores
a node whose children have not all been explored,
which is not applicable when issues are continuous.
Beyond that, in the case where the branching fac-
tor is not small in comparison with the number
of simulation, UCT keeps expanding a new node
without exploring deeper nodes, which loses the
6
interest of MCTS compared to flat Monte Carlo.
In our context, it is therefore necessary to define
a different implementation of MCTS:
Selection For this step, we use progressive
widening, as described by [7]. The expansion
criterion of the progressive widening states
that a new node is expanded if and only if:
nαp ≥ nc (5)
where np is the number of times the parent
has been simulated, nc is its number of chil-
dren and α is a parameter of the model. If the
result is that a new node is not expanded, the
selected node is the node i maximizing:
Wi =
si
ni + 1
+ C × nα
√
ln(n)
ni + 1
(6)
where n is the total number of simulations of
the tree, si is the score of the node i and C is
also a parameter of the model.
Expansion The content of the expanded node is
chosen randomly among all the possible bids
of the domain with an even distribution
Simulation During the simulation, the model of
the opponent bidding strategy is used in order
to make the simulation more representative.
The model of the opponent utility and its ac-
ceptance strategy are used to decide when it
accepts a proposal.
Backpropagation The backpropagation also
uses the opponent utility model. The utility
of both agents is computed and the scores of
both agents is updated for each visited node.
The utility of the agent itself is computed us-
ing its real preference profile.
5.2.2 Pruning
In order to explore only the interesting nodes for
the agent, it is possible to use the knowledge of
the agent on the game to prune the less promising
branches of the tree. Though we do not have much
information in our context, we decide that the op-
ponent should find any offer it made acceptable.
We therefore decide to prune all the branches of
the tree where our agent makes a proposal less
interesting than the best proposal received from
the opponent: the goal is to use the best proposal
of the opponent as a lower bound and to try to
improve on this basic value.
6 Experiments
In order to evaluate our agent, we use the Genius
[18] framework. We confront our agent with the
only agents that do not require a deadline for their
strategy to the best of our knowledge: two vari-
ants of the Tit-for-Tat agent and a RandomWalker
agent. In this section, we describe the implemen-
tations of our agent and those three. We then
describe in detail the experimental protocol and
finally we present the achieved results.
6.1 Implementation
Our agent is developed in Java and consists of a
set of independent modules connected to Genius
platform thanks to interfaces. Figure 2 presents
this architecture (the R represents the messages
sent and received by the agent). It consists of
the components of Section 5: a module for the
MCTS-based bidding strategy (with classes for the
Monte Carlo Tree, its nodes, etc.), a module for
opponent utility modeling and another one for the
opponent bidding strategy modeling. We use the
same acceptance strategy for both our agent and
the model it uses for its opponent. As they are
very simple, there is no module dedicated to them.
As MCTS are computationally expensive and
take quite a long time, we parallelized them. The
stochastic aspect of the opponent bidding strat-
egy model ensures that two simulations going from
the same branch of the tree are not similar, while
still prioritizing the most probable values. The
Gaussian process regression, which relies on ma-
trix computation, has been developed using the
Jama library1. The parameters of the kernel are
optimized using the Apache Commons Math li-
brary utilities2.
The time taken by our agent for each round has
been set empirically. When our agent makes a
choice among 200 bids, there is generally one that
results into a high utility both for it and its oppo-
nent. In order to explore the tree in depth, we let it
enough time to generate about 50’000 simulations.
Then, to make a proposal, our agent takes about
3 minutes. This duration meets the expectation of
the real-world applications of our industrial part-
ners. From these values, we get α = 0.489.
1http://math.nist.gov/javanumerics/
2http://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-math/
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Figure 2: Software architecture of the modules of
our agent
6.2 Opponent’s Description
In this section, we provide a description of the
confronted agents. It is impossible to compare our
agents with state-of-the-art ones, as they all rely
on the supposition that there is a publicly known
deadline. The only three agents able to negotiate
without a given deadline are the RandomWalker,
the Tit-for-Tat agent and its more evolved variant,
the Nice Tit-for-Tat.
6.2.1 RandomWalker
The RandomWalker is described by Baarslag in [3]
and makes random proposals.
6.2.2 Tit-for-Tat
Tit-for-tat agent was first described by Faratin et
al. in [10]. This agent makes a concession when-
ever its opponent makes concessions itself. Several
possible implementations are given. Here, when
it has received fewer than 2 proposals the agent
makes the most interesting proposal from its own
perspective (it generates 10’000 random proposals
and chooses the best one for its utility function).
For the other proposals, the agent looks at the last
two proposals of its opponent and computes the
made concession. This concession may be positive
or negative. It adds this concession to the utility
of its own last proposal. It then searches for a pro-
posal with the closest utility to this target value.
In our implementation, 10’000 proposals are gen-
erated to this end.
6.2.3 Nice Tit-for-Tat
Nice Tit-for-Tat is somehow, a more evolved ver-
sion of the Tit-for-Tat. It has been described by
Baarslag et al. in [4]. The goal of this work is
to comply with domains where mutual agreement
is possible. The agent then uses the same oppo-
nent utility modeling as our agent and uses it to
estimate the Nash point of the setting, i.e. the
agreement maximizing the product of the utilities
of the agents. The concession rate is computed
between the first and the last bids of the oppo-
nent as the percentile of the distance between its
first bid and the Nash point. The corresponding
concession is made from the agent point of view.
Among the equivalent offers, the utility model is
also used in order to choose the best bid for the op-
ponent among equivalent ones for the agent. The
only difference with the version used in our exper-
iments and the agent proposed in [4] is the accep-
tance strategy. Indeed, the strategy proposed in
the original version which is presented in [3] de-
pends on the deadline of the negotiation in order
to take the time pressure into account. Here, we
provide the Nice Tit-for-Tat with a simplified ver-
sion of its acceptance strategy, which corresponds
to the same acceptance strategy as our agent.
6.3 Experimental Protocol
Genius makes it possible to negotiate on numeri-
cal or categorical issues, but not yet on continuous
ones. In order to evaluate our agent, we want to
target a negotiation domain that is at the same
time neutral enough to show the generic aspects
of our work, but complex enough to motivate its
use. ANAC is an international competition used
to determine the effective negotiation strategies.
The negotiation domain used in ANAC 2014 [12]
fits well to this objective. Subsequent competi-
tions focused on multilateral negotiation and spe-
cific application domains. In ANAC 2014 domain,
issues are numerical, varying from 1 to 10. Several
domains have been proposed, varying from 10 to
50 issues. In order to reduce computational com-
plexity which is not the concern of this work, we
use the 10-issue version. The utility functions are
non-linear, and the reserve utility is set to 0, which
is the minimal outcome value for the agents. As
the time pressure is supposed to vary over time,
we do not use a discount rate. While it does not
exactly correspond to the targeted application, its
complexity (1010 possible proposals) makes a suit-
able test bench for our negotiation strategy. In or-
der to simulate the fact that the time pressure is
unknown to the agent, we put a very large dead-
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Figure 3: Average utility of negotiating agents
line, so that it is never reached.
6.4 Results
Figure 3 displays the utility of the agents when ne-
gotiating with each other using a histogram. The
results are averaged over 20 negotiation sessions
with each profile, with error bars representing the
standard deviation from the average.
Note that the two preference profiles are very
different from each other, and not symmetrical at
all. This specificity explains the fact that for all
the agents in all configurations, utility is always
higher with Profile 2 than it is with Profile 1.
As shown on Figure 3a, our agent is able to
beat the Random Walker in every situation, even
when its preference profile is Profile 1 and Random
Walker’s is Profile 2. It is interesting to note that
the negotiations with Random Walker are very
short with only 3.1 proposals in average: 2.5 when
it gets Profile 1 and 3.7 proposals when our agent
gets Profile 2. This difference can be explained
by the fact that it is easy to find agreements with
very high results for Profile 1 (0.9 or more) and
high results for Profile 2 (0.6). In most of the ne-
gotiations, the first proposal of our agent is of this
kind. In that case, Random Walker is more likely
to generate a proposal with utility lower than the
one proposed by our agent and accepts it, gener-
ating a utility of 0.6 for Random Walker and a
negotiation session consisting of a single proposal.
Negotiating with Tit-for-Tat is harder, as we
can see on Figure 3b. Our agent gets a lower utility
than the Random Walker but is able to beat Tit-
for-Tat. The expectation level of Tit-for-Tat also
generates much longer negotiations: 34.2 propos-
als on average with 31.55 proposals when it gets
Profile 1 and 36.85 proposals when our agent gets
Profile 2. This result can be explained the same
way as the results of the negotiation with Random
Walker.
The negotiations with Nice Tit-for-Tat never
ends: the agents keep negotiating forever. Our
MCTS-based method refuses to make a concession
significant enough to have a chance to be accepted
by Nice Tit-for-Tat, considering the high expecta-
tion it has by using the Nash point. Reciprocally,
Nice Tit-for-Tat, without time pressure, and dy-
namic adaptation of its acceptance strategy, does
not accept the proposals of our agent. By looking
at the internal state of the Nice Tit-for-Tat, we
also see that its estimation of the Nash point is
incorrect: it expects a utility above the real one.
We propose instead an indirect evaluation
by confronting Nice Tit-for-Tat with Random
Walker, in the same setting. The results are rep-
resented on Figure 3c. The performances of both
agents are comparable, considering the standard
deviation of the series.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an automated negoti-
ation agent able to negotiate in a context where
agents do not have predetermined deadline, nei-
ther in time nor in rounds, and where the negoti-
ation domain can be composed of numerical, con-
tinuous and categorical issues. We described this
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setting as an extensive game and described a ne-
gotiation strategy based on a specific implemen-
tation of MCTS relying on two opponent mod-
els and a pruning strategy. One of them is the
Gaussian process regression, which relies on a co-
variance function. We tested several covariance
functions and chose the one that provides better
results in context similar to ours.
Experiments were run in the context of a large
negotiation domain, with nonlinear utility func-
tions using different preference profiles. The ex-
perimental results are promising: against all the
agents that can negotiate in its negotiation do-
main, our agent outperformed Random Walker
and Tit-for-Tat and draws with Nice Tit-for-Tat.
This work therefore indicates that techniques from
games such as MCTS can be used with success in
automated negotiation. However, the modularity
of the architecture and the variety of strategies
proposed on General Game Playing and Machine
Learning areas are a huge advantage when it comes
to optimizing the agent for a specific application
domain.
Among the perspectives of this work, we would
like to create a customized version of our agent
and adapt it to the context where the deadline is
known, in order to make it available for these ap-
plications. Our agent can already be used in this
context, but the fact that it does not exploit this
information may make it less efficient than its op-
ponents. Another possible direction would be to
adapt it to the multilateral context. In fact, there
would be little modification to make it available
for a context of stacked alternate protocol or a
many-to-many bargaining scenario, since MCTS
has already been used in n-player games. The use
of our agent in its industrial context, in particu-
lar with corresponding negotiation domains would
yield very interesting results. Last, we would like
to improve our agent by using MCTS variations.
It would be interesting for instance to test other
kinds of pruning. The use of traditional MCTS
techniques such as Rapid Action Value Estima-
tion or All Moves As First to reduce the number
of simulations while keeping their intrinsic quali-
ties would be interesting.
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